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RECENT DECISION
One Man-One Vote: Is It Applicable To Local Government? In
Avery v. Midland County, Texas,1 the United States Supreme Court
applied its "one man-one vote" reapportionment principle to the Mid-
land County Commissioners Court, a local government unit of the State
of Texas having general control over 70,000 inhabitants of Midland
County. Justice White, who delivered the majority opinion, adequately
described the fact situation with which the Court was faced:
The Commissioners Court is composed of five members. One,
the County Judge, is elected at large from the entire county, and
in practice casts a vote to break a tie. The other four are Com-
missioners chosen from districts. The population of those dis-
tricts, according to the 1963 estimates . . . was respectively
67,906; 852; 414; and 828. This vast imbalance resulted from
placing in a single district virtually the entire city of Midland,
Midland County's only urban center, in which 95% of the
county's population resides.2
Having standing as a resident, taxpayer, and voter of the largest
district, the Mayor of Midland sued the Commissioners Court in the
Midland County District Court charging that the population deviation
for the four districts was clearly extreme and that this disproportionate
district size violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Although making no
reference to the Fourteenth Amendment, the trial court ruled for the
petitioner ordering the defendant commissioners to adopt a new plan
in which each district would have substantially an equal amount of
people. 3 The Court of Civil Appeals of Texas reversed expressing the
view that both the Texas and United States Constitutions merely re-
quired "a Republican Form of Government.. ...4
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the Court of Civil Appeals but
also disagreed with the trial court's conclusion that the districts must
be of substantially the same population.5 The Texas Court thought
other factors should be taken into account. These factors included:
(1) that the primary function of the Commissioners Court was ad-
ministrative ;6 (2) that there should be a "balance" between the voices
of rural voters and the voices of urban voters ;7 (3) that the city of
Midland could elect the county-wide officers due to population con-
centration," and concluded:
As we have said, equal rights and equal protection of laws
require equality in political rights and there may be circum-
1390 U.S. 474 (1968).
2Id. at 476.
3 Id. at 477.
4Avery v. Midland County, 397 S.W.2d 919, 921 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
5 Avery v. Midland County, 406 S.W.2d 422 (Tex. Sup. Ct. 1966).
a Id. at 426.
Id. at 428.8 Id. at 428.
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stances under which equality in population of political sub-
divisions electing representatives to an overall governing body
is essential to equality in voting rights. On the other hand, the
convenience of the people in the particular circumstances of a
county may require-and constitutionally justify-a rational
variance from equality in population in commissioners precincts
upon the basis of additional relevant factors such as number of
qualified voters, land areas, geography, miles of county roads
and taxable values.
The Texas Supreme Court then ordered the Commissioners Court to
redistrict itself in accordance with the constitutional guidelines it had
defined and it was at this point that the United States Supreme Court
intervened and took jurisdiction over the case by certiorari. 1°
Justice White proclaimed the majority's extension of the "one man-
one vote" principle to a state's political subdivisions and thereby un-
equivocally maintained that they must comply with the Fourteenth
Amendment:
The actions of local government are the actions of the State.
A city, town, or county may no more deny the equal protection
of the laws than it may abridge freedom of speech, establish an
official religion, arrest without probable cause, or deny due
process of the law.1 '
With numerous state and federal precedents in his favor,12 he went
on to draw an analogy between apportionment of state legislatures
and proper representation in local governmental units:
When the State apportions its legislature, it must have due
regard for the Equal Protection Clause. Similarly, when the
State delegates law-making power to local government and pro-
vides for the election of local officials from districts specified by
statute, ordinance, or local charter, it must insure that those
9 Id. at 428.
10 The question of jurisdiction and of the finality of the Texas Supreme Court
decision was one of the key issues of the case, but it is not within the scope
of this article.
11 390 U.S. at 480.
12 State cases invoking the doctrine of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) to
local governmental units include: Sonneborn v. Sylvester, 26 Wis. 2d 43, 132
N.W.2d 249 (1965); Brouwer v. Bronkema, No. 1855, Cir. Ct., Kent County,
Mich., Sept. 11, 1964, (although the Supreme Court of Michigan divided
evenly on the same question in 277 Mich. 616, 141 N.W.2d 98, (1966)) ; Miller
v. Board of Supervisors, 63 Cal. 2d 343, 405 P.2d 857 (1965); Montgomery
County Council v. Garrot, 243 Md. 634, 222 A.2d 164 (1966); Armentrout v.
Schooler, 409 S.W.2d 138 (Mo. App. 1966); Seaman v. Fedourich, 16 N.Y2d
94, 262 N.Y.S.2d 444, 209 N.E.2d 778 (1965); Bailey v. Jones, 81 S.D. 617,
139 N.W.2d 385 (1966); and Newbold v. Osser, 425 Pa. 478, 230 A.2d 54
(1967). Cases generally holding that state political subdivisions must comply
with the Fourteenth Amendment include: Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) ;
Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960) ; and Terminello v. Chi-
cago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). Federal cases applying Reynolds v. Sims are many
and include: Ellis v. Mayor of Baltimore, 234 F. Supp. 945 (D. Md. 1964),
aff'd and remanded, 352 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1965) ; Martinolich v. Dean, 256 F.
Supp. 612 (D. S.D. Miss. 1966); Strickland v. Burns, 256 F. Supp. 824 (D.
M.D. Tenn. 1966).
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qualified to vote have the right to an equally effective voice in
the election process. If voters residing in oversize districts are
denied their constitutional right to participate in the election of
state legislators, precisely the same kind of deprivation occurs
when the members of a city council, school board, or county
governing board are elected from districts of substantially un-
equal population."3
The majority, also placing emphasis upon the role of the local govern-
mental unit in the United States today, stated that it was impressed by
the amount of policy and decision making left to the local units and
noted the immunity that many local bodies enjoyed from legislative
interference. Indeed, it was with relative ease that the Court made the
transition from the principles of Reynolds v. Sins 4 to the instant case.' 5
Next, the Court ventured into the arena of political science, citing
works from that discipline and apparently attempting to document its
conclusion that the County Commissioners Court was a legislative as
opposed to an administrative unit of the Texas government. And,
although the Court found no difficulty in so concluding, its alegal
journey into political science foreshadowed the use of many treatises
on that subject by the minority opinions8 and was also prophetic of
the problems inherently present in any adjudication of a like fact
situation.
Finally, after speaking in terms of substantial equality of voting
power through an elimination of disparate representation on the local
level, after a seemingly unequivocal introduction of "one man-one vote,"
and after a multitude of logically pure comparisons of voting rights
with freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and so on, the Court
apparently qualified Avery's import, from a constitutional standpoint,
and distinguished it from Reynolds v. Sims. In what appears as an
afterthought or cautionary postscript the decision explains:
The Equal Protection Clause does not, of course, require that
the State never distinguish between citizens, but only that the
distinctions that are made not be arbitrary or invidious. The con-
clusion of Reynolds v. Sims was that bases other than popu-
lation were not acceptable grounds for distinguishing among
citizens when determining the size of districts used to elect
members of state legislatures. We hold today only that the Con-
'3 390 U.S. at 480.
14 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
15 The reasoning indulged in being unsurprisingly similar to the Supreme Court's
language in applying its original Baker ruling (Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186(1962)) to the Reynolds situation.16 The following texts were among those cited: ANDERSON & WEIDNER, STATE
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT (1951); ADRIAN, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS(1960); INTERNATIONAL UNION OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES, LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1961) ; NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL
COUNTY CHARTER, (1956); DUNCOMBE, COUNTY GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA(1966); BENTON, TEXAS, ITS GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS (1966); MAcCORKLE
AND SMITH, TEXAS GOVERNMENT.
1968]
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stitution permits no substantial variation from equal population
in drawing districts for units of local government having general
governmental powers over the entire geographic area served by
the body.' 7
As in so many of its decisions, the Court failed to define key
phrases in the formula which was put forth to resolve the difficulties
in the specified area. What are "general governmental powers"? What
is an "entire geographic area"? The majority inferred that a unit as
"minute and miniscule" as a school board would come under the
purview of this decision.' 8 It is hard to conceive of the practicality and
enforceability of such a ruling.' 9
Justices Harlan, Fortas, and Stewart dissented in Avery with almost
identical expressions of doubt as to the Court's jurisdiction over what
they considered a non-final judgment by the Texas high court . 2 Harlan
hinged his remaining argument on the impossibility and impractability
of the majority decision explaining:
I consider this decision, which extends the state appor-
tionment rule of Reynolds v. Sims . . . to an estimated 80,000
units of local government throughout the land, both unjustifiable
and ill-advised.
I continue to think that these adventures of the Court in the
realm of political science are beyond its constitutional powers.2"
Harlan accurately pointed to certain administrative difficulties that had
not been resolved under the Reynolds ruling. Whereas the majority
made the theoretical transition from state governments to localities,
Harlan made the practical transition. The mysteries present in the
Court's attempt at solving the reapportionment problem for the fifty
states would only be multiplied by the "bewildering variety '2 2 of local
governments that are covered by Avery. The result, claimed Harlan,
would deprive units "of the desirable option of establishing slightly
specialized, elective units of government such as Texas' county com-
missioners court. 23
The remainder of Fortas' dissent, although recognizing the in-
tricacies involved in the Court's entrance upon the local scene, sug-
gested that if the Court were going to enter this field of local govern-
17The majority opinion closes with two examples put forth where the Court
has allowed experimentation: Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105
(1967) ; and Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967).Is 390 U.S. at 480: "If voters residing in oversize districts are denied their con-
stitutional right to participate in the election of state legislators, precisely the
same kind of deprivation occurs when the members of a city council, school
board, or county governing board are elected from districts of substantially
unequal population."19 By sheer reason of numbers this would be difficult to envision.
20 390 U.S. at 486, 495, and 509.
21390 U.S. at 487.
22390 U.S. at 490.
23 390 U.S. at 492.
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ment, then equal protection of the laws could only be achieved "by a
system which takes into account a complex of values and factors, and
not merely the arithmetic simplicity of one equals one."24 (Harlan had
specifically singled out this section of Fortas' dissent arguing that it
was as equally unsatisfactory from a practical point of view as the
majority's position. "For it would bid fair to plunge this Court into
an avalanche of local reapportionment cases with no firmer constitu-
tional anchors than its own notions of what constitutes 'equal protec-
tion' in any given instance." 25 The only way to avoid the pitfalls in
the solutions of both the majority and Fortas, is the totally unsatis-
factory "hands off" policy of Harlan.) Fortas also pointed to the
inherent practical difficulties connected with any future attempt by the
Court to adjudicate the question of whether a citizen on the local level
had a vote substantially equal to his fellow citizens when he was
"usually subject to several local governments with overlapping juris-
diction," 2 but, unfortunately, suggested nothing to fill the present void
of substantial voter inequality. Fortas ended his dissent with the argu-
ment, much like the Texas Supreme Court's argument, that other fac-
tors, such as tax impact, would have to be taken into account if the
Court were going to enter this field.
Stewart essentially agreed with the dissent of Fortas expressing
his well-known feelings as to the one man-one vote rule and reappor-
tionment.2 7 Speaking specifically of the invasion of the local political
arena, Stewart warned much like Fortas that local apportionment was
"far too subtle and complicated a business to be resolved as a matter
of constitutional law in terms of sixth-grade arithmetic." 28
Upon reviewing the decisions of the courts of Texas, the majority
decision of the United States Supreme Court, and the strongly-worded
dissenting views of Harlan, Fortas, and Stewart, it would seem that the
applicability of the one man-one vote rule to local governments is a
path through a maze of practicalities, side effects, and inherent problems.
Among these practicalities are factors as simple and basic as the
intricate structuring and intertwinement of units of government. Cer-
tainly malapportionment should not be allowed the sanctuary of "safety
in numbers," but it is obvious that the Supreme Court might find baby-
sitting for 80,000 units of local government a perplexing task.
The side effects of one man-one vote upon the local units themselves
are at best predictable. Fortas' dissent pessimistically predicted an ill
effect on the city-suburban relationship. 29 Professor Robert G. Dixon,
24390 U.S. at 496.
25 390 U.S. at 494.
26390 U.S. at 500.
27 Stewart's views on this subject can be found in Lucas v. Colorado General
Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, at 744 (dissenting opinion) (1963).
28390 U.S. at 510.
29 390 U.S. at 497: "And while I have no doubt that, with the growth of suburbia
19681
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Jr., on the other hand, thoroughly discussed the implications of re-
apportionment upon county governments and took a very different
stand on such side effects.30 He spoke of malapportionment as the most
crucial obstacle to the development of "urban counties" which in turn
might be a chosen instrument for "metropolitan salvation." 31 Speaking
before Avery, Dixon's following prediction optimistically cited the side
effects of a decision like Avery:
In short, by judicial fiat, and as a totally unexpected by-
product of the original state legislative reapportionment suit
from Tennessee in 1962, we may soon have on hand a ready-
made political instrument for 'metro' development, in the form
of reinvigorated county government, that probably could not have
developed in a generation of popular referenda. A county board
on which all sections of the county-city, suburban, rural-are
represented approximately in proportion to their population,
could be a ready-made 'metro' instrument. The traditional char-
acter of the county should ease the path to acceptability.3 2
Dixon also saw the more difficult challenge that local reapportion-
ment poses warning that "particularly in those states with a tradition
of township organization, [it] is a more complex, more challenging,
and potentially more revolutionary process than state legislative re-
apportionment. 3 3
There are also inherent problems. For example, what does the Court
mean by its conveniently vague "arbitrary and invidious" test? What
is "an allowable population disparity" ?34 It was a simple matter, almost
a constitutional reflex, to declare that districts of 67,906; 852; 414;
and 828 were grossly disproportionate, but it will be in the gray fact
situations that the idea of "the substantially equal vote" will provide
the Court with its most challenging realities. As is the case with so
many "breakthrough" decisions, only time and cautious but perceptive
decisions by the Supreme Court in this vast new area will allow a true
evaluation as to whether or not one man-one vote is applicable to local
governmental units. PATRIcK K. HETRICK
Federal Courts and Procedure: Abstention: Under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action authorized by law to be commenced by any person
... (3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any state law, ...
and exurbia, the problem of allocating local government functions and benefits
urgently requires attention, I am persuaded that it does not call for the
hatchet of one man, one vote."
0330 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 57 (1965).
31 Id. at 70.
32Id. at 73.
3 Id. at 74.34For example of the problems present when the Court deals with population
disparities see Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1963).
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